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Abstract
This work presents an asset pricing model that under rational expectation
equilibrium perspective shows how, depending on risk aversion and noise volatil-
ity, a risky-asset has one equilibrium price that differs in term of efficiency: an
informational efficient one (similar to Campbell and Kyle (1993)), and another
one where price diverges from its informational efficient level. The former Pareto
dominates (is dominated by) the latter in presence of low (high) market risk per-
ception. The estimates of the model using S&P 500 Index support the theoretical
findings, and the estimated inefficient equilibrium price captures the higher risk
premium and higher volatility observed during the Dot.com bubble 1995–2000.
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Introduction
This work presents an asset pricing model that under rational expectation equilibrium
perspective shows how, depending on risk aversion and noise volatility, an economy
has one equilibrium price that differs in term of efficiency: an informational efficient
one (similar to Campbell and Kyle (1993)), and another one where price diverges from
its informational efficient level. The combination of risk aversion and noise volatility,
considered as exogenous to our economy, measure the “risk perception” of the informed
investors who seek the optimal investment between a risky asset and a risk-free asset.
In particular, the model shows that price is efficient when informed investors have a
low market risk perception, and is inefficient when investors’ risk perception is high,
and it proves that the efficient one Pareto dominates (is dominated by) the inefficient
one in presence of low (high) market risk perception.
The work uses the economy described in Campbell and Kyle (1993) (hereinafter
C.K.) which considers a riskless and a risky asset, and investors trading with noise
traders. The latter aim to capture the irrationality of financial market, such that price
is written as a linear function of the investors’ information set and a noise variable. It is
important to remark that, in their model, price is always “semi-strong” efficient because
it equals the sum of the expected future discounted dividend (Fama (1970)) and the
noise term. Finally, they add a constant term to capture the risk-premium demanded
by a risk-averse investors and they find evidence of such “semi-strong” efficient price
form using real data (S&P 500 Index).
This work extends the celebrated model assuming that price is not always the
expected future discounted dividend although investors still assume a price in the
“semi-strong” form. The theoretical model, and the empirical evidence, finds an efficient
price only when risk-aversion and noise volatility are low, while it deviates from such
efficiency when risk perception is high. Result is obtained in the theoretical model: (i)
letting the coefficients of the “semi-strong” price be misspecified, when investors search
the optimal investment strategy; (ii) searching with simulations the price that makes
optimal the demand, for a given set of exogenous parameters; (iii) using the maximum
Utility criteria to choose among several candidates equilibrium prices, each solution of
the investment problem, the equilibrium price.1
Put in other words, in C.K. price is a-priori efficient and the investors find the cor-
responding Utility value once the exogenous parameters of the economy are estimated.
In this work price is a-priori inefficient thus depending on the level of the exogenous
variables either the informational efficient or the informational inefficient equilibrium
will have the highest Utility. Such equilibrium price can be the efficient one, when risk
aversion and noise volatility is low, and inefficient when risk perception is high.
The following implications of the main result derive for financial markets: (i) in-
vestors consider an inefficient price as a profitable condition if risk perception is high;
(ii) a combination of high risk aversion and high price volatility solely lead the result,
1The Pareto-dominance is proved numerically due to the high degree of non linearity of equations
in the optimal investment problem.
1
that is a low (high) risk aversion combined with high (low) noise volatility does not
necessarily allow to determine an inefficient price; (iii) when risk aversion is high, there
exists a threshold value of noise volatility, and a consequent threshold value of price
volatility, inducing the investors to have a higher Utility with inefficient equilibrium
price.
The empirical estimates of the model support the theoretical results. Using the
long time series of S&P 500 Index (1871-2009) and Nasdaq Index (1974-2009) there
are the following results: (i) data reflects the fundamental value, that is the efficient
price, during the long period 1871-2009; (ii) data shows that S&P 500 price Index was
not efficient during the period 1995-2000 known as the Dot.com bubble; (iii) Nasdaq
price Index was not efficient during the period 1995-2000. The likelihood ratio test,
used to compare the fit of the two models, rejects at 1% the null hypothesis of the
efficient price. In conclusion, the estimates seem to confirm the theoretical results that
focus on the role of market noise volatility and investors’ risk aversion to determine
that inefficient price.
Furthermore, the empirical estimates shows that (i) investors ask a higher risk
premium when risk perception is high, and the inefficient price holds in the market; (ii)
there is an high estimated value of market volatility during the Dot.com bubble. The
two evidences confirm the well-known empirical anomalies such as the equity premium
and the excess volatility puzzle, as a key-drivers of the higher risk involved in period
of market turbulence.
Last, it is important to remark the limits of this model: (i) it does not help to
explain the endogeneity relationship between risk perception and efficient (inefficient)
equilibrium price, because the risk perception’s parameters are treated as exogenous;
(ii) it does not analyze the dynamics from the efficient to the inefficient equilibrium (and
conversely), inasmuch as any equilibrium price is solution of the investors investment
optimization problem.
1 Literature
The idea that financial markets are perfect and correctly report the information has
been widely debated since Fama (1970)2 introduced the Efficient Market Hypothesis
(EMH) as an equilibrium condition to test in asset pricing models. In turn, what has
not been adequately analyzed thoroughly is that, undesirable as they may be, inef-
ficient prices characterize financial markets and, according to this work, they can be
an equilibrium phenomenon desired by the market participants. In efficient markets
prices are informative, transmit and make public the private information of the in-
vestors. Conversely, a market where price changes are not entirely due to the arrival
2 The term was originally coined in an unpublished working paper by Harry Roberts (1967),
whereas the history of the efficient market hypothesis begins with Cardano in 1564 as reported by
Sewell (2008).
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of new information is inefficient because prices do not report correctly all the available
information.
The works of Grossman (1976), Grossman and Stiglitz (1976), and later Kyle (1985,
1989) and C.K. (1993) are the first to include EMH and the presence of informed
investors and noise traders in a contest of competitive markets.3 These works study
the role of information in price dynamics considering: (i) the informed investors as
rational active traders who know everything and their trading is perfect, and (ii) noise
traders as such investors who do not collect information and whose trading activity
is informative for others. In such models, price can deviate from the fundamental
value due to the action of noise traders and the desire of the rational investors to
exploit them as much as possible. REE perspective had great success in capturing the
dynamics and informativeness of asset prices, mainly because of the easy tractability of
the equilibrium price and, because of the existence of a semi-strong efficient price. In
such models noise traders play a key role in clearing the market and avoiding breakdown
of the market.4 Despite these important theoretical results, and some critiques for the
induced ’schizophrenia” of the informed investors (Hellwig (1980), Kyle (1989), Back
(1992)), some important market empirical anomalies have not been captured (see Siegel
(2002) for an extensive review of all anomalies). The financial literature of last twenty
years reviewed these apparent anomalies, taking the efficient markets hypothesis as a
benchmark. They include the equity premium puzzle (Mehra and Prescott (1985)),
the excess volatility in stock returns and price-dividend ratios (Grossman and Shiller
(1981), LeRoy and Porter (1981), Shiller (1981)), and the predictability of stock returns
(Poterba and Summers (1988), Fama and French (1989), Campbell and Shiller (1988)).
According to Shiller (1998) these anomalies suggest that the underlying principles of
rational behavior, and the efficient markets hypothesis, are not entirely correct and
that we need to look ’as well at other models of human behavior’. This model shows
that the informational efficient and inefficient price are both an equilibrium condition
when both rational and irrational investors trade in the market.
The theoretical findings of this work are closer to Monte et al. (2010) who show,
in an asymmetric information setting similar to Wang (1993), that financial markets
admit different equilibria: a low investors’ risk perception induces investors to trade as
perfect competitors, and consequently informationally efficient equilibria are achieved,
while a high investors’ risk perception leads investors to behave as imperfect competi-
tors, and informationally inefficient equilibria result. This work does not consider the
asymmetry in the information structure, such as difference among informed or un-
informed investors, though it is the first to support empirically the main theoretical
findings.
The model has been recently extended (see Monte and Formenti, w.p. 2012) con-
sidering two investors who, besides observing the publicly known dividend realizations,
hold two different pieces of private information on the growth rate of dividend. The
3 See Brunnermeier, 2001 for an extended literature review.
4 Without the presence of noise traders, the no-trade theorem of Milgrom and Stokey (1982) applies
and there is no exchange.
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two groups differently informed compete each other to rationally extract their missing
pieces of information from the demand for the risky asset of their competitors. In a
Bayesian Nash equilibrium perspective, each group ends up with forecasting the fore-
casts of their competitors. A change in the assumption do not modify the results shown
in this work. Besides the full informative equilibria, in which all private information
is revealed and the competition of the two groups of investors ceases, it is shown that
partially informative equilibria exist and the learning process, as well as the compe-
tition between the two groups, is never ending. As a major consequence, in partially
informative equilibria the risky asset price reflects inefficiently the private information.
Moreover, there is still evidence that partially informative equilibria Pareto dominate
the full informative ones on the increasing of noise volatility and the investors’ risk
aversion.
The paper is organized as follows. The economy is spelled out in Section 2. Section 3
shows the model equilibria, the efficient price (Equilibrium-Type A) and the inefficient
price ones (Equilibrium-Type B), and the utility criteria used to compare them. Section
4 calibrates the model and it shows the theoretical results. Section 5 provides the
estimates of the model and it shows that real data supports the main theoretical results.
Section 6 concludes.
2 The Economy
Consider an economy composed of informed risk-averse rational investors and noise
traders exchanging a risky asset. The informed investors, or large trader interchange-
ably, are risk averse and observe the dividend process having a private information
regarding the dividend growth rate; the noise traders represent the economic agents
who exchange the asset without maximizing any Utility function, appear in the market
randomly to buy/sell the asset for liquidity reasons and capture the irrationality of the
market. Assume that dividend and price are normally distributed and that changes
in the level of dividend and stock price have constant variance. As a consequence the
variance of percentage returns and dividend growth rate increases (decreases) when the
level of price and dividends decreases (increases). Now de-trend dividend and stock
prices by an exponential growth trend ξ, obtained by market data as the dividend
growth mean. The de-trending operation on price and dividend let the new variables
follow an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process. According to C.K. (1993) the de-trended oper-
ation has two other effects: it removes exponential growth from the ex-ante mean of
the data and from the variance of data. The latter one has an effect similar to a log
transformation such that
D(t) ≡ Du(t)e−ξt P (t) ≡ P u(t)e−ξt (1)
where the variables Du and P u are the observed dividend and price of the stock, and
D(t) and P (t) are the de-trended dividend and price. Assume that changes in Dt and
Pt are homoskedastic and normally distributed and, both have one unit root with a
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particular combination of levels of price and dividend that is stationary, that is they
are cointegrated. Let r be the time-invariant riskless interest rate. A permanent one-
dollar changes in the de-trended dividend has a discounted value of 1/(r − ξ) dollars,
and the cointegrating stationary vector is D(t) − (r − ξ)P (t) with the unconditional
mean equals to γ = E[D(t)− (r− ξ)P (t)]. In turn, the investors decompose price into
the sum of a fundamental value, a constant term, and a noise term:
P (t) =p0 + V (t) + Θ(t) (2)
where p0 ≡ γr−ξ captures the constant risk premium per share of stock demanded
by risk-averse informed investors, V (t) represents the expected future dividend (i.e.,
public information) and the non-dividend component (interpreted as the investors’
private information):
V (t) = pD0D0(t) + pD1D1(t) + pII(t) (3)
and Θ(t) is the noise component. This price’s form is convenient because (i) it is
linear, (ii) it does not require any assumption about the discount rate, and (iii) the
noise trading component, given by a random supply of the stock, captures the presence
of liquidity traders. Finally, note that noise trading influences the stock price because
the informed investors are risk-averse and ask a risk premium that is captured by the
constant term. A special case of Equation (2) is the benchmark case (Equilibrium-Type
A) and the efficient price derived in the work of C.K. (1993) in which the fundamental
value V (t) is the present expected value of dividends and non-dividend discounted at
the risk-less rate r.
Dividend structure. There are continuous dividend announcements to the market.
The de-trended dividend is the sum of the permanent and temporary components, in-
dependently distributed, both of which are directly observed by the informed investors:
D(t) = D0(t) +D1(t).
The permanent component is a brownian motion process, and the temporary compo-
nent is a mean reverting process, a continuous-time AR(1), given by
dD0(t) = αII(t)dt+ σ0dw0(t), dD1(t) = −αDD1(t)dt+ σDdwD(t) (4)
where dw0(t) and dwD(t) are two standard independent brownian motions, σ0 and σD
constitute the innovations in D0(t) and D1(t), and the quantities σ20 and σ2D are the
innovation variance of D0(t) and D1(t) respectively. The idea that dividends have
a private hidden information content is an old one (see Lintner (1956), Miller and
Modigliani (1961), Watts (1973)) and it has been tested empirically by several works
(Shiller (1981), DeAngelo et al. (1992)). The parameter αI captures this hidden
private information content in the dividend process and is useful for scaling the unit
of I. I(t) measures how much D0(t) is expected to increase in the future. The positive
parameter αD measures the mean speed reversion of the transitory component and
−αDD1(t) measures the expected growth rate of dividend.5
5 The scaling parameter does not change the final results (see C.K. (1993), Appendix A).
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Information structure. Informed investors receive private information I(t) (a pri-
vate signal) about the asset price. It is convenient to interpret I(t) as the “non-dividend
information” component. C.K. (1993) defines I(t) as the measurement error on the
transitory component. The information process is defined as I(t) ≡ Dˆ1(t) − D1(t) =
D0(t) − Dˆ0(t), where [Dˆ0(t); Dˆ1(t)] are the investors’ estimates of D0(t) and D1(t)
respectively. The information dynamics is a mean reverting process
dI(t) = −αII(t)dt+ ρIσ0 dw0(t) + (2ρI − ρ2I)1/2σ0 dwI(t) (5)
in which dwI(t) is a standard brownian motion independent of dw0(t), and σI consti-
tutes the innovation in I(t). Investors receive new information about the traded stock
captured by the two random components of the process, measured by the standard
deviations σ0 and σI . The parameter αI captures the mean-reverting speed at which
the new information is updated into the price. As αI increases (decreases), private
information decays faster (slower) and it is short lived in the price dynamics. The
correlation structure between dD(t) and dI(t) is given by χ = − ρI√
2ρI
, which ensures
that
E {I(t+ s) | D[−∞, t]} = 0, s ≥ 0 (6)
and the history of the dividend process cannot forecast the future of I(t). A technical
condition 0 ≤ ρI ≡ σ2I/2σ20 ≤ 2 guarantees that D does not forecast I, and the variables
D(t) and I(t) are independently distributed. C.K. (1993) show that Equation (6)
uniquely determines the diffusion term in the [D(t), I(t)] processes.
Noise trading. Following noisy rational expectational models, the total amount of
risky asset supply is 1 + Θ(t). The process Θ(t) models the deviation of the current
risky asset supply from its long-run stationary level normalized to 1 and it implies that
noise traders have inelastic demand of 1−Θ(t) shares of the stock at time t. Moreover,
Θ(t) is interpreted as the number of remaining shares available to the market. The
noise process has a non-null mean reverting dynamics
dΘ(t) = −αΘΘ(t) dt+ σΘ dwΘ(t), (7)
in which dwΘ(t) is a standard Brownian motion independent by [dwD0(t), dwD1(t),
dwI(t)], the positive parameter αΘ is the constant mean speed of reversion of the process
Θ(t) towards its long-run null level, and σΘ is the volatility of noise. The stochastic
supply of the risky asset in the aggregate market makes the market incomplete.
The informed investors observe the history of D(t), I(t) and P (t) so at time t their
information set is
F(t) ≡ σ[D0(s), D1(s), I(t),Θ(t), P (t); s ≤ t] = σ[D(t), I(t), P (t); s ≤ t].
The informed investors direct observation of I(t) and Θ(t) implies that in equilibrium
the observation of the price (2) is equivalent to the observation of the signal pD0D0(t)+
pD1D1(t). On the other hand, the observation of the public dividend D(t) is equivalent
to the observation of the signal D0(t) + D1(t). Therefore, from the observation of
D(t), I(t) the investors can also observe D0(t) and D1(t).
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CARA-Utility. The informed investors have a constant absolute-risk aversion (CARA)
Utility function
u[t, c(t)] = −e−[βt+ϕc(t)], (8)
where β is the time-impatience parameter and ϕ is the coefficient of the absolute risk
aversion. The use of the CARA Utility function, and the assumption of normality
of dividend and stock prices, let the expected future dividend be discounted at the
riskless rate of interest. This is equivalent to saying that an increase in the expected
future dividend, given by a higher value of investors’ private information, is captured
by a change in the variable V (t) in Equation (2), while an increase (decrease) in the
informed investors’ risk aversion causes a lower (higher) risk premium captured by the
higher (lower) constant term. Investors choose consumption and inventory of risky
assets to maximize their Utility given the information set
max
Ψ(t), c(t)
E
[
−
∫ +∞
t=0
u[t, c(t)] dt |F(t)
]
The use of CARA preferences implies the investors’ optimal asset demand and the
optimal equilibrium price are independent of their wealth distribution as well as the
level of aggregate wealth. This is why CARA Utility greatly simplifies the optimization
problem. The model has a closed-form solution according to CARA preference.
3 Equilibrium
The equilibrium of the economy described in Section 2 is solved using the REE perspec-
tive developed by Lucas (1972), Green (1973), Grossman (1976), and Kreps (1977).6
The mechanism is the following one: (i) investors solve the optimization problem and
maximize the Utility considering the market-clearing price as parametric; (ii) investors
and noise traders submit a scheduled demand to a Walrasian auctioneer; (iii) the
auctioneer announces a price and receives from all market participants what their
demand/supply would be at that price; (iv) the auctioneer clears the market and de-
termines the equilibrium price.
Following the procedure described above, the investors conjecture the price’s form
linearly depending on the state variables of the economy:
P (t) = p0 + pD0D0(t) + pD1D1(t) + pII(t) + Θ(t) (9)
in which p0 is expected to be negative, as it is the discount on price requested by the
risk averse investors due to risk-premium, the state variables [D0(t), D1(t)] account for
the observed dividend D(t), I(t) is the hidden stationary private information, and Θ(t)
is the aggregate supply shock of the stock. The variance of the stock price is given
by σ2P = p2D0σ
2
D0
+ p2D1σ
2
D1
+ p2Iσ
2
I + σ
2
Θ. Assume a constant variance of price implies
6 The book by Hens and Schenk-Hopp (2009) presents a wide discussion of different theoretical,
analytical, and empirical techniques under REE that explain the market dynamics of asset prices.
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the variance of percentage of returns increases as the price of the stock decreases and
vice versa. This is a phenomenon studied since the works of Black (1976) and Nelson
(1987).
Investment opportunity. Stock price has the following process
dP (t) = [−pD1αDD1(t) + (pD0αI − pIαI)I(t)− αΘΘ(t)] dt+H dw(t) (10)
where H = {pD0σ0 + pIρI σ0, pD1σD, pI
√
2ρI − ρ2Iσ0, σΘ} and dw(t) is the vector of
brownian motions. The investment opportunity given by Q(t) is the instantaneous
excess return on one share of risky asset, and it is given by the process
dQ(t) = [D(t)− rP (t)] dt+ dP (t) (11)
where the risk-less rate r is assumed to be constant. Q is the undiscounted cash flow
from the zero-wealth portfolio while dQ(t) is interpreted as the return on a zero-wealth
portfolio long of one share of stock fully financed by borrowing at the risk-less rate (see
Wang (1993)).
Given the process (10), Q(t) satisfies the stochastic differential equation
dQ(t) = [D(t)− rP (t)] dt+ dP (t) (12)
= [e0 + eD0D0(t) + eD1D1(t) + eII(t) + eΘΘ(t)] dt+H dw(t)
where e0 = −rp0, eD0 = 1 − rpD0 , eD1 = 1 − pD1(r − αD), and eΘ = −(r + αΘ).
The conditional expectation of the excess return of one share of stock is E[dQ] =
[e0 + eD0D0 + eD1D1 + eII + eΘΘ] dt. Notice that the expected excess return is affected
by all the state variables of the economy while, noise volatility directly influences price
volatility without affecting the investment opportunity. As in Wang (1993), the level
of aggregate stock supply affects dQ because it determines the total risk exposure of
the economy.
The optimization problem. The investors’ wealth W (t) has the following dynam-
ics:
dW (t) = [rW (t)− c(t)] dt+ Ψ(t) dQ(t), (13)
where c(t) is the investor’s consumption policy, Ψ(t) is the investors’ inventory as
the holding of the risky asset at time t. Investors maximize the expected value of
the exponential Utility over the infinite time horizon, subject to the wealth dynamics
and given the information set at time t, by controlling their inventory Ψ(t) and their
consumption c(t). The investor’s optimization problem is
max
Ψ(t), c(t)
E
[
−
∫ +∞
t=0
e−[βt+ϕc(t)] dt |F(t)
]
(14)
s.t. dW (t) = [rW (t)− c(t)] dt+ Ψ(t) dQ(t)
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where E[ · |F(t)] is the conditional expectation operator given the information set F(t).
Let J(Z,W, t)7 be the value function, where (Z,W ) are the state variables moving the
investment opportunities and Z = (1, D0, D1, I, Θ)
>. The variables of the economy
can be written in compact form as a Vector Autoregression (VAR).
dZ(t) = AZ(t) dt+B1/2dw(t) (15)
where
A ≡

0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 αI 0
0 0 −αD 0 0
0 0 0 −αI 0
0 0 0 0 −αΘ
 , B1/2 ≡

0 0 0 0
σ0 0 0 0
0 σD 0 0
−ρIσ0 0 (2ρI − ρ2I)1/2σ0 0
0 0 0 σΘ
 .
(16)
The value function J(Z,W, t) satisfies the Bellman equation
0 = max
Ψ(t), c(t)
{
−
∫ +∞
t=0
e−[βt+ϕc(t)] + E [dJ(Z,W, t)] ds
}
(17)
dZ(t) =AZ(t) dt+B1/2dw(t)
dW (t) =[rW (t)− c(t) + Ψ(t)SZ(t)] dt+ Ψ(t)T 1/2dw(t)
0 = lim
s→∞
E [J(Z,W, t+ s)] .
Theorem 1 The investors’ conjectures the following form of the value function
J(Z,W, t) = −e−βt−rϕW+Φ(Z)−λ, (18)
where Φ(Z) = 1
2
Z>LZ, the optimal share of the stock is
Ψ˜(t) = −T
1/2
(
B1/2
)>
L− S
rϕT
Z(t), (19)
and the optimal consumption is given by
c˜(t) =
1
2
Z>(t)LZ>(t) + rϕW (t) + λ− ln(r)
ϕ
, (20)
where L ≡ (li,j)5i,j=1 is a symmetric real matrix and λ is a real number satisfying
r[1 + λ− log(r)]− β − 1
2
tr
[(
B1/2
)>
LB1/2
]
= 0. (21)
7 The assumption is that J(Z,W, t) is twice differentiable in each of the state variables.
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The investors’ demand and consumption equation are optimal when coefficients of ma-
trix L are solutions of the following algebraic Riccati equation
LUL− LX −X>L− Y = 0, (22)
for
U ≡ B1/2
[
TI4 −
(
T 1/2
)>
T 1/2
] (
B1/2
)>
X ≡ T (A− 1
2
rI5
)−B1/2 (B1/2)> S (23)
Y ≡ S>S
and In is the identity matrix with dimensions n.
Proof. 1 See Appendix A.
Note the risk-less asset is assumed to be constant because investors search stationary
equilibrium price when variables are not time-varying. In turn, the interest rate directly
affects the price coefficient to account variation in the macroeconomic environment8.
Market clearing. Market clearing is the condition ensuring the conjectured price in
Equation (9) is the equilibrium price. The condition constraints the investors’ demand
to equalize the stochastic risky asset supply. Assuming the number of informed and
noise traders grow at rate ξ and normalizing the initial population of each group to
unity, the per capita amount of share supplied is equal to the share per informed traders
(see C.K. (1993)). Therefore investors’ demand must sum to 1+Θ when market clearing
condition applies
Ψ˜(t) = 1 + Θ(t). (24)
According to Equation (24) the coefficients of Ψ˜(t) must satisfy the following equalities
ψ0 = 1, ψD0 = 0, ψD1 = 0, ψDI = 0, ψΘ = 1 (25)
that are used in the optimization problem (19–23) to determine the price coefficients
[p0, pD0 , pD1 , pI ]. Equation (23) verifies that the conjectured form of the equilibrium
price (9) is the optimal one. On this account the investors’ optimization problem should
be more appropriately interpreted as the determination of the risky asset price that
makes the rational investors’ equilibrium demand for the risky asset optimal. Theorem
(1) and market clearing condition (24) determine an equilibrium price of two types:
the efficient price (Equilibrium-Type A) and inefficient price (Equilibrium-Type B).
The latter differs from the former when at least one of its coefficient deviates from the
ones determined by the efficient condition.
8 A more intriguing issue arise when assuming a risk-less asset that depends on the nature of the
equilibrium, so the interest rate depends on the type of efficient or inefficient equilibrium price. The
work avoids to treat that issue due to the ambitious work of determining the solution of the Riccati
equation when some parameters depends on the nature of the equilibrium.
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Equilibrium-Type A: Efficient Equilibrium Price The efficient equilibrium price
states the fundamental value V (t) is the expected present value of dividend and non-
dividend at the risk-less rate r.
Proposition 1 The economy defined in Equations (4–8) has a stationary rational ex-
pectations equilibrium in which price is efficient:
P˜ (t) = V˜ (t) + p˜0 + Θ(t) (26)
= p˜0 + p˜D0D0(t) + p˜D1D1(t) + p˜II(t) + Θ(t)
where
V˜ (t) = Et
∞∫
s=0
e−rsDu(t+ s) ds = Et
∞∫
s=0
e−(r−ξ)sD(t+ s) ds
and price P˜ (t) has the following coefficients:
p˜0 = −
(
[(r − ξ + αI)2 − 2(r − ξ)αIρI ]σ20
(r − ξ)2(r − ξ + αI)2 +
σ2D
(r − ξ + αD)2
)
r
r − ξϕ (27)
p˜D0 ≡
1
r − ξ , p˜D1 ≡
1
r − ξ + αD , p˜I ≡
1
r − ξ −
1
r − ξ + αI (28)
Proof. 2 See Appendix B.
The constant term is obtained when informed investors maximize their objective
function (14) using the price coefficients in the form of Equation (27). Note that
p˜0 depends on the fundamental parameters (αD, αI , ρI , σ0, σD) and mainly by the
investors’ risk aversion ϕ which affects the expected return on the stock by increasing
risk premium with a higher negative term. As shown in C.K. (1993) and Wang (1993),
this is a simple discount on the price to account for the increasing discount rate. Finally
note that it is possible to extract from (27) the algebraic form of γ given in Equation
(2) and, indirectly, having a measure of the investors’ risk aversion using real data.
Equilibrium-Type B: Inefficient Equilibrium Prices An informationally inef-
ficient equilibrium price is any equilibrium price who deviates from its fundamental
value, defined in Equilibrium-Type A. The economy defined in Equations (4–8) has a
stationary REE in which the equilibrium price is informationally inefficient given by
P̂ = p̂0 + p̂D0D0(t) + p̂D1D1(t) + p̂II(t) + Θ(t) (29)
when at least one of the price coefficients is not equal the efficient ones shown in
Equation (27).
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3.1 Utility Function
There are several candidates equilibrium price, which correspond to Equilibrium-Type
A or Equilibrium-Type B, for any given set of exogenous parameters. Each candidate
is solution of the infinite-horizon optimization problem and the Walrasian auctioneer
Pareto rank the candidate equilibrium prices according to the Utility criteria. Finally, it
considers the one with the highest Utility for the informed investors as the equilibrium
price. The value function (18) has the following form when Theorem (1) is verified:
J(Z,L, λ, t) = λ+
1
2
l1,1 + f [D0(t), D1(t), I(t),Θ(t)] (30)
where the constant term λ+ 1
2
l1,1 is different for each candidate equilibrium price and
represents the “essential Utility part” of the value function. The “essential Utility part”
selects among different equilibrium candidates is J˜(L, λ) ≡ λ+ 1
2
l1,1. Since we are in a
suitable neighborhood of the origin of the Euclidean space of the states of the economy
(D0, D1, I,Θ) we have ZLZ ' l1,1, such that
−e−βt−rϕY+ 12Z>LZ−λ ' βt+ rϕY + J˜(L, λ).
The higher is the “essential Utility part” of the expected Utility, the higher is the
expected Utility itself in the considered neighborhood.
To put in evidence how result is obtained and what is the corresponding economic
interpretation. Under a technical point of view, result is driven by a maximization
of the investment problem using a price a-priori inefficient (Equilibrium-Type B) and
different market conditions. For any market condition there are several candidates
equilibrium price due to the high non-linearity of equation (22 - 23). The “essential
Utility part” helps to select among them the price giving the investors the highest
Utility. As long as risk-aversion and noise volatility increases the Equilibrium-Type B
Pareto dominates the Equilibrium-Type A.
The economic interpretation of this result is as follows: (i) investors always find
the profitable price for their investment problem, given any market conditions; (ii) as
long as they perceive a low level of risk in the market, they get more Utility trading
with noise an efficient price; (iii) in turn, a change in risk perception lead the profitable
condition to an inefficient price; (iv) investor ask a higher risk-premium as a compensa-
tion of the higher perceived risk. Last, only a change of risk perception can modify the
obtained Equilibrium-Type from the efficient to the inefficient one, and the contrary.
As a consequence of this result, there exists a critical threshold of price variance,
below (above) which price converges to an informationally efficient (inefficient) equilib-
rium. The threshold depends on private and public information, and on the noise asset
volatility. According to our results, when noise volatility represents a bigger proportion
of price volatility price loose is efficiency and investors ask a bigger risk premium with
respect to the one asked if the efficient price had been the equilibrium one.
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4 Numerical Solutions
This section shows with numerical routines the candidates equilibrium price and the
correspondent “essential Utility part.” The exogenous parameters of the model are as
follow9:
r = 0.05; ξ = 0.011; β = 0.30; ϕ = 0.50;
αD = 0.50; αI = 0.40; αΘ = 0.05;
σ0 = 0.50; σD = 0.10; σI = 0.40; σΘ = 0.50.
Table I shows several candidates equilibrium price and the one with the highest “es-
sential Utility part”, the equilibrium price in in grey. It is important to stress that
the equilibrium price obtained numerically is the same one derived algebraically in
Proposition (1) where
p˜0 =− 91.773, p˜D0 =
1
r − ξ = 25.641,
p˜D1 =
1
r − ξ + αD = 1.855, p˜I =
αI
(r − ξ)(r − ξ + αI) = 18.446.
[Insert Table I]
The efficient equilibrium price Pareto dominates the inefficient ones. The constant
term p˜0 = −91.773 is negative, as requested by the model to account for the expected
return on the stock for risk-averse informed investors. The other candidates equilibrium
price are inefficient because they present a lower (higher) value of pI or pD0 with respect
to the full-informative price. As a consequence of this inefficiency investors request a
higher (lower) value of discount term (risk premium) as a compensation for inefficiency.
Table II shows the candidate equilibrium prices when investors’ risk aversion changes
to unity.10 Among the candidate equilibrium prices, the one with the highest “essential
Utility part” (λ+ 1
2
l1,1 = 43.96) is an inefficient one with coefficients:
p̂0 = −2664.632, p̂D0 = −89.311, p̂D1 = 1.855, p̂I = −13.384
in which p̂D0 = −89.311 and p̂I = −13.384, the coefficients associated with the perma-
nent component of dividend and with private information, deviate from their efficient
values given by p˜D0 =
1
r−ξ = 25.641 and p˜I =
αI
(r−ξ)(r−ξ+αI) = 18.446.
[Insert Table II]
9 The choice of the parameters follows Wang (1993)
10 We double the risk aversion parameter with respect to Table I
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The negative coefficients represents the investors’ willingness to negatively correlate
the private and public information flows with price. Finally, investors ask a higher
discount: p̂0 = −2, 664.632 as a compensation for the inefficient equilibrium price
achieved: the higher discounted term demanded might explain the well-known equity
risk premium.
Table III shows an analogous result when noise volatility increases, i.e., σΘ is unity.
The equilibrium price is characterized by the following coefficients:
p̂0 = −465.202, p̂D0 = −80.445, p̂D1 = 1.855, p̂I = −87.639
where the permanent component coefficient p̂D0 = −80.445 and private information
coefficient p̂I = −87.639 deviate from the efficient reference values.
[Insert Table III]
There is still a negative value of pD0 to account that investors’ demand is anti-
correlated with the permanent component of dividend. To remark that it does not
imply that price moves downward when dividend increases because the coefficient mea-
sures the price reaction to dividend news. On the other hand, the price dynamics is
mainly driven by the constant part.
Figure 1 (6) shows the “essential Utility part” of the efficient (Equilibrium-Type
A) and inefficient (Equilibrium-Type B) prices as function of risk aversion and noise
volatility. For ϕ = 0.1 and σΘ = 0.1 the equilibrium price is the efficient one as shown
by the higher Utility (red area). An increase of noise volatility to ϕ = 3.0 let the
efficient one still Pareto dominate the inefficient ones. Contrariwise, with ϕ = 0.5 the
equilibrium price depends only on the values of noise volatility. A further conclusion
is that risk aversion has a stronger effect on that result with respect to noise volatility.
Robustness check. Numerical results are obtained letting the machine search for
mathematical solutions using the Newtonian method. We initialize the research letting
the price coefficients and each element of Equation (23) range over (−10; 10). All
equations and starting values are real, and the research is given only for real roots.
Results are controlled by expanding the range and using the method of secant. A
significant change in the exogenous parameters of the model does not impact the final
result. Finally, a combination of high risk aversion and high price volatility solely lead
the result. This is verified increasing the dividend (σ0, σD) and private information
volatility (σI).
5 Econometric Method and Empirical Results
5.1 Preliminary Data Analysis
The estimates of the model are performed using the annual U.S. time-series data taken
from Shiller (2000) and used in other works such as C.K. (1993) and Campbell and
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Shiller (1987, 1988). Dataset consists of monthly stock price, the corresponding divi-
dend data, and a price index during the period January 1871–December 2009.11 The
real stock price is the Standard and Poors Composite Stock Price Index multiplied by
the CPI-U (Consumer Price Index-All Urban Consumers) in June 2010, and divided
by the corresponding CPI. The procedure is applied to the corresponding S&P Stock
Price dividend per share to obtain the real dividend series (see, Shiller (2000)). Jan-
uary of each year is considered as the annual data point to avoid problems with time
aggregation.
The real unadjusted price and dividend are P ut and Dut to distinguish from the
de-trended values Pt and Dt, as in Equation (1). The value ξ = 0.0115 is the average
mean dividend growth rate over the all sample. The de-trended operation aims to
remove the exponential growth from the ex-ante mean of data without forcing data to
revert to a trend line. Secondly, it gets rid of the exponential growth from the variance
of data, a rescaling effect similar to a logarithm transformation. Finally, Dt and Pt
are normalized such that the mean of price is equal to one by dividing each time series
with the mean of price. Figure 1 plots the de-trended real price and dividend × 10.
Table IV presents the main statistics of dataset and Table V presents the results of
ADF, PP, and KPPS test for stationarity both for Pt and Dt, and for P ut and Dut .
[Insert Table IV]
[Insert Table V]
The same test are computed for ln(P ut ) and ln(Dut ) as a control. Unit roots test show
that price and dividend have unit roots in the first level. The results for ADF, with
five lags, and PP test for Pt, P ut , and ln(P ut ) do not always reject the null hypothesis
of nonstationarity, while KPPS always rejects stationarity. The ADF test for Dt, Dut ,
and ln(Dut ) does not reject the null in presence of a trend at the 5% level. KPSS
confirms the unit root in level of dividend. The PP test accounts for autocorrelation
of the error term and, it shows that dividend is stationary with trend.12 In light of the
results above, it is assumed a unit root in the stock price and dividend time series, as
shown in C.K. (1993) and Campbell and Shiller (1987, 1988). Finally note that the
de-trended operation does not have any effect on the unit root assumption.
Table VI reports other time series properties of data such as the sample correlation
of the integrated process ∆Pt, ∆Dt until the fifth lags and, in the bottom of the table,
the sample standard deviations of ∆Pt and ∆Dt.
[Insert Table VI]
11 The dataset was retrieved from Robert Shiller’s website at http://www.econ.yale.edu/shiller/.
12 Assuming a unit root in dividend implies that noise does not help to explain the stock price
volatility (as shown by Kleidon (1986), Marsh and Merton (1986), and Timmermann (1996)).
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The correlation analysis suggests that price and dividend have a mean reverting
component: this is due to the positive first autocorrelation (0.14 and 0.22, respectively)
while the other autocorrelations are negatives.13 The result supports the rejection of the
null hypothesis of unit root for dividend. The cross correlation between the dividend
change from the end of one year to the end of the next one, ∆Dt, and the corresponding
price change, ∆Pt, shows a very low value at the contemporaneous level (0.03), and at
the third level (0.06). On the other hand, there is a high correlation (0.44) between ∆Dt
and ∆Pt−1, supporting that only price changes between Pt and Pt−2 help to explain
changes in actual dividend. In conclusion, there is evidence that an hidden variable,
the so called “private information” It, might help to explain the relationship between
price and dividend.
The model assumes that price and dividend have one unit root, they are integrated
processes of order one I(1), and that a linear combination is stationary [they are I(0)].
The existence of cointegration is tested with Engle-Granger two-step method (where
the null is no cointegration, and the residual is a random walk). Table VII shows the
regression result and the ADF test on the residuals.
[Insert Table VII]
The estimate Dt = 0.073 + 0.012Pt using the heteroskedasticity-robust standard
error reports that two-thirds of dividend’s mean is explained by the constant term. The
ADF test rejects the unit root hypothesis at 5% supporting the existence of a linear
combination of Pt and Dt. In turn, the coefficient regressor (0.012) is equal to (r− ξ),
the interest rate less the dividend growth rate (ξ = 0.011), implies a low interest rate
equals to 2.4%; a low level justified by the high constant term. The regression without
a constant gives Dt = 0.022Pt, which implies an interest rate of 3.3%. Reversing the
estimate the regression is Pt = −3.113 + 57.003Dt, such that (r − ξ) = 0.017 and
r = 2.9%. The latter value is closer to the mean rate of return on the stock index
(3.4%). In conclusion, the model considers r = 3% and as a control r = 6% and r free
to account different interest rate during the long period used in the estimates.
5.2 Estimates of the Model
The model is set up in continuous time while dataset is in discrete time. The use of an
exact discrete analog, according to the procedure originally introduced by Bergstrom
(1966, 1983) and recently discussed in McCrorie (2009), allows the estimates of the
model. A different procedure such as in C.K. (1993) estimates the discrete time trans-
formation of the original continuous time model when it is possible to show that the
stacked vector of point-sampled and time-averaged transformation of the continuous-
time variables follow a discrete-time AR(1) process. In turn, the choice of the exact
13 The autocorrelation sample in 1871–1988 supports the mean reverting component only for divi-
dend, as C.K. (1993) show in their work.
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discrete analog follows from the benefits of the state space approach: price and divi-
dend are the observed variables, or the measurement equation of the state space model,
while Z(t) is the vector of state variables representing the transition equation. The
state space dynamics is in compact form as
Yt = C(µ)Zt (31)
dZt = A(θ)Ztdt+B
1/2(θ) dw(t)
where the vector Yt = [Pt, Dt], the matrix C(µ) contains the price coefficients [p0, pD0 , pD1 , pI , 1],
{A(θ), B(θ)} are matrices containing the unknown parameters θ = [αD, αI , αΘ, σ0, σD, σI , σΘ]
and, dw(t) is the vector of independent brownian motions. Appendix B reports the
exact discrete matrices of the continuous time model and the corresponding likelihood
function. Kalman filter is used to extract the hidden information and to compute
the estimates of the parameters. Data are non-stationary such that it is used a non-
informative (diffuse) prior distribution for the corresponding parameters. The filter
is initialized assuming the unconditional mean of each state variables as zero and an
arbitrarily large covariance matrix as suggested by De Jong (1991).14
Data 1871–2009 Table VIII shows the Maximum Log-Likelihood (ML) values of
the estimates of model A, where it is assumed the informationally efficient price form
as given in Equation (27), and Equilibrium-Type B, in which there are not constraint
into the price coefficients.
[Insert Table VIII]
Each row of the table presents different assumptions about the interest rate, while
the columns report the absence or the presence of market noise. The main findings are:
(i) Equilibrium-Type A has higher MLs for any assumption about interest rate even
assuming there are no noise traders in the market; (ii) noise traders strongly improve
the goodness of the model, as shown in C.K. (1993), when interest rate equals 3%
and 6%; (iii) the assumption of full noise and interest rate equals 3% let the estimate
of Equilibrium-Type A (ML equals 834.88) be higher than Equilibrium-Type B (ML
equals 830.65); (iv) the previous result is confirmed when interest rate is assumed
equals to 6% or when we estimate it separately.
Table IX shows the estimates of price coefficients and two results are straightfor-
ward: (i) the constant term p0 is negative as shown by the theoretical model to account
for the risk aversion of the investors; (ii) the estimate of the interest rate equals 3.09%
(with ML = 831.62) when we assume an efficient price and full noise; this is in line
with the implied interest rate obtained in the regression.
[Insert Table IX]
14 The variance covariance matrix is a diagonal matrix with 106 on the diagonal.
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Finally, the overall estimates reflect that S&P 500 Index correctly reports the fun-
damental value during the period 1871–2009 and the EMH prevailed. It is important
to emphasize that during the long period there were at least two structural breaks that
are not considered in the estimates of the model. In turn, the estimates are used to
confirm the informational efficiency of the S&P 500 Index and, to compare the results
with those of C.K. (1993).
Dot.com Bubble The theoretical results given in Section 4 have some evidences
on real financial data using monthly prices and dividends of the S&P 500 Index during
1995–2000. Table X shows unit root tests values at 5% level: price and dividend have
unit roots in level and they are stationary if differenced of order one. In the bottom of
Table X we test the cointegration using Johansen’s methodology.
[Insert Table X]
The values of λmax = 30.55 (15.67) and λtrace = 31.79 (19.96) reject the null
hypothesis at 5% level of zero cointegrating vector and they accept the hypothesis of
one vector of cointegration. The regression price on dividend is Dt = 0.049 + 0.0017Pt,
using the heteroskedasticity-robust standard error, therefore using ξ = 0.0011 the
implied interest rate is r = 0.0028. As C.K. (1993) have shown, the low interest
rate value is justified by the high value of λ. The regression without the constant
let r = 1.5% that is more suitable. In any way, the model estimates are performed
assuming the interest rate equals to r = 1.5%, 3%, and be free.
Table XI presents the main empirical results: the ML of Equilibrium-Type B is
always higher than ML of Equilibrium-Type A. The higher ML is obtained using r =
1.5% that is closer to the implied interest rate.
[Insert Table XI]
The Likelihood Ratio test is used to test the fitting ability of the two models. In
turn, LR-test rejects at 1% the null hypothesis of Equilibrium-Type A, in favor of
Equilibrium-Type B, for any given assumption of the interest rate.
Table XII reports the price coefficients of Equilibrium-Type A and Equilibrium-
Type B for different assumptions about interest rate.
[Insert Table XII]
There is evidence that the constant term is negative as suggested by the model
and, the estimate of r when is free is very low (r = 0.002). This is in line with the
preliminary analysis, although the assumption r = 1.5% has been considered more
reliable.
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The estimates of the parameters shown in Table XIII support the theoretical results:
(i) the constant term estimated according to Equilibrium-Type B is lower (p0 = −0.061)
with respect to the constant term of Equilibrium-Type A (p0 = −0.177) thus risk-averse
investors demand a lower risk premium when price is inefficient and, as a consequence,
price increases (as the positive asset bubble shown in Figure 2); (ii) the permanent
component of the dividend process is informationally efficient (pD0 = 71.942 and pD0 =
71.944 in Equilibrium-Type A and Equilibrium-Type B, respectively) while investors
estimate a lower value of their private information (pI = 0.001) and the permanent
component of dividend (PD1 = 1.089): this is confirmed with the calibration exercised
computed in Section (4); (iii) the low value of pI shows that private information decays
very fast (αI = 0.905): investors cannot exploit their private information for a long
period; (iv) the inefficient price has the highest ML when investors has a high noise
volatility with respect to dividend and information: σΘ = 0.124 (see Table XIII), an
evidence of the theoretical results.
[Insert Table XIII]
6 Conclusion
The main result of this work is the existence of two types of equilibrium prices both so-
lutions of the optimal investment of the informed risk-averse investors: the semi-strong
efficient one, in which price reflects the fundamental asset value, and the inefficient ones
where the quality informativeness of price is lost. The model shows that the equilib-
rium price, selected among multiple candidate prices as the one with highest utility for
the informed investors, is determined by the investors’ market risk perception which is
measured in terms of risk aversion and noise volatility. The efficient price Pareto dom-
inates (is dominated by) the inefficient one when risk aversion is low (high) and when
noise volatility is low (high). In conclusion, a change in the market risk perception
drives the type of equilibrium from efficiency to inefficiency.
The second result of the work is the existence of a critical threshold of price volatility
below (above) which investors prefer a price informationally efficient (inefficient). The
threshold depends on the informative component owned by the informed investor,
the private and public information, and depends on the noise contribution to asset
volatility. As long as the fundamental value is the main driver of the asset volatility
the EMH holds; contrariwise, an higher proportion of noise driving the price volatility
lead investors to prefer an informationally inefficient price.
The third result of this work is that using real data, the estimates of the model
confirm the theoretical findings. The S&P 500 Index reflects the fundamental value,
given by dividend and hidden private information, during the long period 1871–2009.
On the other hand, data do not support the market efficiency hypothesis in the sub-
period 1995–2000 and they endorse the main models’ theoretical findings. The higher
maximum log-likelihood of the model under inefficient price assumption rejects, using
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the likelihood ratio test, the null hypothesis of an efficient market at 1%. The result is
confirmed under different assumptions of interest rate. Furthermore (i) the estimated
inefficient price shows that investors demand a lower risk premium, which according
to the theory leads to a price increase shown in the Dot.com bubble; (ii) investors
estimate a very fast decay of the private information on price, which leads to lower
sensitivity of their private information on the price supporting the role of noise; (iii) a
high value of noise volatility supports the developed theory.
In conclusion, the inefficient equilibrium price captures some market anomalies
observed in a real financial market when higher risk is involved: (i) the equity risk
premium puzzle is explained by a higher discount rate, requested by the risk averse
investors when inefficient price hold in the market; (ii) the higher discount rate moves
in excess the price volatility with respect to the one observed whether EMH had held.
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Appendix A. Solution to Investors’s Optimization Prob-
lem
Proof of Theorem 1. The investor’s optimization problem is solved conjecturing the
value function (18) is the investor’s objective function (14). The value function has the
following form
J(Z,W, t) = −e−(βt+rϕW−Φ(Z)+λ),
where Φ(Z) = 1
2
Z>LZ, Z = (1, D0, D1, I, Θ)
> is defined as the (5x1) vector of the
state variables and L ≡ (lj,k)5j,k=1. The dynamics of Z(t) is written in compact form
as in equation (15). The excess return per one share of stock is written in terms of the
state vector P (t) = P¯Z(t) such that
dQ =(D(t)− (r − ξ)P (t))dt+ dP (t) = (D(t)− (r − ξ)P¯Z(t))dt+ P¯AZ(t)dt+ P¯B1/2dw(t)
=SZ(t)dt+ T 1/2dw(t)
where
S(t) ≡M−P¯ (r−ξ)+P¯A, M ≡ (0, 1, 1, 0, 0), P¯ ≡ (p0, pD0 , pD1 , pI , 1), T 1/2 ≡ P¯B1/2
It is proved that
(i) the function (14) is a solution to the Bellman equation
∂tJ(Z,W, t) + max
Ψ,c
{GJ(Z,W, t)− e−(βt+ϕc)} = 0, (32)
where G is the infinitesimal generator of the diffusion process (Z(t),W (t));
(ii) the control (Ψ˚(t), c˚(t)) satisfies
(Ψ˚(t), c˚(t)) ∈ arg max{GJ(Z˚(t), W˚ (t), t)− e−(βt+ϕ˚c(t))} = 0,
where (Z˚(t), W˚ (t)) is a solution to
dZ(t) =AZ(t)dt+B1/2dw(t) (33)
dW (t) =(rW (t)− c(t) + Ψ(t)SZ(t))dt+ Ψ(t)T 1/2dw(t)
corresponding to the choice of (Ψ˚(t), c˚(t));
(ii) the trasversality condition
lim
T→+∞
EZ,W,t
[
J(t+ T, Z˚(t+ T ), W˚ (t+ T ))
]
= 0, (34)
where (Z˚(t), W˚ (t)) is a solution to (33).
21
To show that J(Z,W, t) = −e−(βt+Φ(Z)+ϕrW+λ) is a solution of (32), the operator G
is determined:
G ≡ 1
2
∑5
j,k=1Bj,k ∂
2
Zj ,Zk
+ Ψ
∑5
j=1 T
1/2
(
B1/2
)>
j
∂2W,Zj +
1
2
Ψ2 T ∂2W,W
+
∑5
j=1(AZ)j ∂Zj + (rW − c−ΨSZ) ∂W .
(35)
On the other hand, using J as a shorthand for J(Z,W, t)
∂ZjJ = −(Z>L)jJ, ∂WJ = −rϕJ, ∂2Zj ,ZkJ =
(
LZZ>L− L)
j,k
J,
∂2Zj ,WJ = rϕ(Z
>L)j J, ∂2W,WJ = r
2ϕ2 J.
Therefore
GJ = 1
2
(∑5
j,k=1 Bj,k
(
LZZ>L− L)
j,k
)
J + 1
2
r2ϕ2TΨ2 J+
rϕ
(∑5
j=1
(
T 1/2
(
B1/2
)>)
j
(Z>L)j
)
ΨJ −
(∑5
j=1(AZ)j (Z
>L)j
)
J − rϕ (rW − c− SZΨ) J.
(36)
Thanks to the properties of the trace functional
5∑
j,k=1
Bj,k
(
LZZ>L− L)
j,k
J = tr
(
(B1/2)>(LZZ>L− L)B1/2) = Z>LBLZ−tr((B1/2)> LB1/2) .
(37)
Moreover,
5∑
j=1
(
T 1/2
(
B1/2
)>)
j
(Z>L)j = T 1/2
(
B1/2
)>
LZ, (38)
and
5∑
j=1
(AZ)j (Z
>L)j = Z>LAZ. (39)
Combining (36) with (37)-(39), it follows
GJ = 1
2
Z>LBLZ − 1
2
tr
((
B1/2
)>
LB
1/2
u
)
J + rϕT 1/2
(
B1/2
)>
LZ ΨJ + 1
2
r2ϕ2T Ψ2J
−Z>LAZ J − rϕ (rW − c− SZΨ) J.
(40)
The latter, on account of
∂tJ = −βJ, Z>LAZ = 1
2
(Z>A>LZ + Z>LAZ)
it is possible to rewrite Equation (32) in the form(
−β + 1
2
Z>LBLZ − 1
2
(Z>A>LZ + Z>LAZ)− 1
2
tr
((
B1/2
)>
LB1/2u
)
− ϕr2W
)
J
(41)
+ max
Ψ,c
{rϕ((T 1/2 (B1/2)> L+ S)ZΨ + 1
2
rϕTΨ2)J + ϕrcJ − e−(βt+ϕc)}
= 0.
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Setting
J ≡ J(t, Z,W,Ψ) ≡
(
(T 1/2
(
B1/2
)>
L+ S)ZΨ +
1
2
rϕTΨ2
)
J,
and
K ≡ K(t, Z,W, c) ≡ rϕcJ − e−(βt+ϕc),
it is possible to get
max
Ψ,c
{rϕ((T 1/2 (B1/2)> L+ S)ZΨ + 1
2
rϕTΨ2)J + ϕrcJ − e−(βt+ϕc)}
= rϕmax
Ψ
{J(t, Z,W,Ψ)}+ max
c
{K(t, Z,W, c)}
Maximizing J [resp. K] with respect to Ψ, the first conditions are
dJ
dΨ
=((T 1/2
(
B1/2
)>
L+ S)Z + rϕΨT )J = 0
dK
dc
= rϕJ + ϕe−(βt+ϕcu) = 0
that yields
Ψ˜ = −(T
1/2
(
B1/2
)>
L+ S)
rϕT
Z c˜ =
1
2
Z>LZ + rϕW + λ− log(r)
ϕ
which is the desired optimal demand (19) and optimal consumption (20).
Moreover, the second order condition
d2J
dΨ2
= rϕTJ ≤ 0 d
2K
dc2
= −e−ϕc ≤ 0
guarantees that Ψ is optimal for J and, similarly, c is optimal for K. As a consequence,
max
Ψ
{J(t, Z,W,Ψ)} = − 1
2rϕT
(
Z>
(
LB1/2(T 1/2)> + S>
) (
T 1/2
(
B1/2
)>
L+ S
)
Z
)
J
and
max
c
{K(t, Z,W, c)} = r
(
1
2
Z>LZ + rϕW + λ− log(r) + 1
)
J.
In light of what shown above, the Bellman equation (41) takes the form(
−β + 1
2
Z>LBLZ − 1
2
(Z>A>LZ + Z>LAZ)− 1
2
tr
((
B1/2
)>
LB1/2u
)
− ϕr2W
)
J
− 1
2T
(
Z>(LB1/2(T 1/2)> + S>
) (
T 1/2
(
B1/2
)>
L+ S
)
ZJ
+ r
(
1
2
Z>LZ + rϕW + λ− log(r) + 1
)
J = 0
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that is
1
2
Z>
(
LBL− 1
T
(
L>B1/2(T 1/2)> + S>
) (
T 1/2
(
B1/2
)>
L+ S
)
− A>L− LA+ rL
)
ZJ
(42)
+
(
rλ+ r(1− log(r))− β − 1
2
tr
((
B1/2
)>
LB1/2
))
J = 0.
On the other hand,
LBL− 1
T
(
LB1/2(T 1/2)> + S>
) (
T 1/2
(
B1/2
)>
L+ S
)
− A>L− LA+ rL (43)
=
1
T
(
LB1/2
(
TI5 −
(
T 1/2
)>
T 1/2
) (
B1/2
)>
L
)
− 1
T
(
L
(
B1/2
(
T 1/2
)>
S + T
(
A− 1
2
rI5
))
+
(
S>T 1/2
(
B1/2
)>
+ T
(
A> − 1
2
rI5
)
L
)
+ S>S
)
.
Therefore, combining (42) with (43), it follows that J(t, Z,W ) is a solution of the
Bellman equation (32), provided that the matrix L and the parameter λ are chosen to
fulfill (22) and (21), respectively.
The trasversality condition (34) holds true when the Itô’s formula is applied to the
identity
J(t+ ∆t, Z˚(t+ ∆t), W˚ (t+ ∆t))− J(t, Z˚(t), W˚ (t)) =
∫ t+∆t
t
dJ(s, Z˚(s), W˚ (s))
which allows to write
J(t+ ∆t, Z˚(t+ ∆t), W˚ (t+ ∆t))− J(t, Z˚(t), W˚ (t)) =
∫ t+∆t
t
(∂sJ(s, Z˚(s), W˚ (s)) + GJ(s, Z˚(s), W˚ (s))) ds
+
∫ t+∆t
t
B
1/2
Z,W∇Z,WJ(s, Z˚(s), W˚ (s)) dw˜(s),
where B1/2Z,W stands for the diffusion matrix of the process (Z˚(s), W˚ (s)) and ∇Z,W de-
notes the gradient operator in the state space of (Z˚(s), W˚ (s)). On the other hand, since
J (t, Z,W ) is a solution of the Bellman equation (17) and (Z˚(s), W˚ (s)) corresponds to
an optimal control we get∫ t+∆t
t
(∂sJ(s, Z˚(s), W˚ (s)) + GJ(s, Z˚(s), W˚ (s))) ds =
∫ t+∆t
t
e−(βs+ϕ˚c(s)) ds.
On account of the latter, applying the expectation operator on both the sides of (??)
Et,Z,W
[
J(t+ ∆t, Z˚(t+ ∆t), W˚ (t+ ∆t))
]
− Et,Z,W
[
J(t, Z˚(t), W˚ (t))
]
∆t
=
1
∆t
Et,Z,W
[∫ t+∆t
t
e−(βs+ϕ˚c(s)) ds
]
,
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and, passing to the limit as ∆t→ 0, it follows
dEt,Z,W
[
J(t, Z˚(t), W˚ (t))
]
dt
= Et,Z,W
[
e−(βt+ϕ˚c(t))
]
.
On the other hand, by virtue of c-first order condition,
e−(βt+ϕ˚c(t)) = −βJ(t, Z˚(t), W˚ (t)).
Hence, Et,Z,W
[
J(t, Z˚(t), W˚ (t))
]
satisfies the differential equation
dEt,Z,W
[
J(t, Z˚(t), W˚ (t))
]
dt
= −βEt,Z,W
[
J(t, Z˚(t), W˚ (t))
]
,
and the desired trasversality condition follows.
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Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 1
The efficient market hypothesis states that price is efficient when it is the expected
future discounted dividends
P (t) = E
 ∞∫
s=0
e−rsDu(t+ s)ds | Ft
 = E
 ∞∫
s=0
e−(r−ξ)sD(t+ s)ds | Ft
 (44)
where the process D(t), the continuos-time dividend yield of a risky asset, is defined
as D(t) = D0(t) +D1(t) and
dD0(t) =αII(t)dt+ σ0dw0(t),
dD1(t) =− αDD1(t)dt+ σDdwD(t),
dI(t) =− αII(t)dt+ ρIσ0dw0(t) + (2ρI − ρ2I)1/2σ0dwI(t)
Rewrite the dividend and informative signals as a trivariate Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process
with Z = (D0, D1, I)>
dZ(t) = A1Z(t)dt+B
1/2
1 dw(t) (45)
where
A1 ≡
 0 0 αI0 −αD 0
0 0 −αI
 , B1/21 ≡
 σ0 0 00 σD 0
−ρIσ0 0 (2ρI − ρ2I)1/2σ0
 , dw(t) ≡
 dw0dwD
dwI
 .
(46)
Now Z(t) has the following integral form
Z(t+ s) = H(s)Z(t) +
s∫
τ=0
eA(s−τ)B1/2dw(t+ τ),
where H(s) = eAs. Solving differential equation dH(s)/ds = AH(s), with boundary
condition B(0) =
 1 0 00 1 0
0 0 1
 yields
H(s) =
 1 0 1− e−αIs0 eαDs 0
0 0 e−αIs
 .
Since E [D(t) | Ft] = D(t) we have
E [D(t+ s) | Ft] = D0 + eαDsD1 + (1− e−αIs)E [I(t) | Ft] ,
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thus
E
 ∞∫
s=0
e−(r−ξ)sD(t+ s)ds | Ft
 = Et ∞∫
s=0
e−(r−ξ)s
{
D0 + e
αDsD1 + (1− e−αIs)E [I(t) | Ft]
}
ds
=
1
r − ξD0(t) +
1
r − ξ + αDD1(t) +
1
r − ξ −
1
r − ξ + αI Iˆ(t),
and the coefficients are
p˜D0 ≡
1
r − ξ , p˜D1 ≡
1
r − ξ + αD , p˜I ≡
1
r − ξ −
1
r − ξ + αI
The constant term is obtained from Equation (19) imposing the efficient price described
above when market clearing condition (24) holds true
Ψ˜ = −T
1/2
(
B1/2
)>
L− S
rϕT
= 1
where
T 1/2 =
(r − ξ − αI(ρ− 1))σ0
(r − ξ)(r − ξ + αI) ; B
1/2 = 0; S = −(r − ξ)p0
T =
(
− α
2
I (−2 + ρI) ρIσ20
(r − ξ)2 (r − ξ + αI)2
+
(
1
r − ξ −
αIρI
(r − ξ) (r − ξ + αI)
)2
σ20 +
σ2D
(r − ξ + αD)2
+ σ2Θ
)
that implies
p˜0 = −
(
((r − ξ + αI)2 − 2(r − ξ)αIρI)σ20
(r − ξ)2(r − ξ + αI)2 +
σ2D
(r − ξ + αD)2
)
r
r − ξϕ,
solution of the proof.
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Appendix C. From Continuous Time Model to Discrete
Time Data
The model is in continuous-time while data are discrete. We use Bergstrom’s (1984,
Thm. 3, p. 1167) solution to reformulate the model such that the discrete version,
called the exact discrete solution, satisfies the discrete-time data. As underlined by
McCrorie (2009), the exact discrete model differs from conventional discrete-time VAR
models in that the coefficient matrix and the covariance matrix are functions of the
exponential of a matrix. The exact discrete form is obtained from the solution of the
continuous-time model (15) given by
Z(t) = F (θ)Z(t− 1) + t (t = 1, . . . , T ), (47)
where
F (θ) = eA(θ), (t = 1, . . . , T ), (48)
and the variance-covariance of the independent Gaussian white noise is the solution of
the following integral
E(t 
>
t ) =
∫ 1
0
erA(θ)Σ(µ)
(
erA(θ)
)>
dr = Ω(θ, µ) (49)
where we assume constant riskless rate and zero mean and covariance matrices: E(t) =
0, and E(t>s ) = 0 with (s 6= t).
The exact discrete form (47-48) gives the following matrices
F (θ) =

1 1− eαI 0 0
0 eαI 0 0
0 0 eαD 0
0 0 0 eαΘ

Ω(θ, µ) =

−σ20(e−2αI (−1+eαI )2ρ−αI)
αI
−σ20e−2αI (−1+eαI )2ρI
αI
0 0
−σ20e−2αI (−1+eαI )2ρI
αI
−σ20(−1+e−2αI )ρI
αI
0 0
0 0 − (−1+e−2αD )σ2D
2αD
0
0 0 0 − (−1+e−2αΘ )σ2Θ
2αΘ

(50)
that is used to estimate the parameters θ = [αI , αD, αΘ, σ0, σD, σΘ, ρI ] in the likeli-
hood function. The estimates of the unobservable state vector Z(t) are based on the
information available to time F(t), where F(t) contains the observed data y until y(t).
Kalman filter recursive procedure gets the estimates of the parameters θ in the state
vector. The method of diffuse prior to initialize the Kalman filter is used assuming
zero mean for the all state variables and, for the variance-covariance an identity matrix
with 106 on the diagonal.
The likelihood function of y(t) data has joint density L =
∏T
t=1 p(yt | It−1) where
p(yt | Ft−1) = N(ŷt|t−1, ft|t−1) and ft|t−1 = E(yt−ŷt|t−1)(yt−ŷt|t−1)>. The log-likelihood
28
is given by
ln L = −1
2
T∑
t=1
ln|ft|t−1| − 1
2
T∑
t=1
(yt − ŷt|t−1)>f−1t|t−1(yt − ŷt|t−1). (51)
such that the estimates of the parameters θ is given maximizing the equation (51).
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Figures
Figure 1. Market Risk Perception measured by risk aversion (ϕ) and noise volatility
(σΘ) with the corresponding utility of equilibrium price of Equilibrium-Type A and
Equilibrium-Type B.
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Note The red area describes the utility values obtained by the informed investors when the effi-
cient equilibrium price holds in the market (Equilibrium-Type A) while green area describes the
utility obtained by the informed investors when the inefficient equilibrium price holds in the mar-
ket (Equilibrium-Type B). The green area is higher than the red one when noise volatility and risk
aversion contemporaneously increase.
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Figure 2. S&P 500 1850-2005: price and dividend (x10).
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Note More details on the dataset are available in Shiller’s book (2000). According to Shiller (2000)
monthly dividend data are computed from the S&P four-quarter tools for the quarters since 1926,
with linear interpolation to monthly figures. Dividend and earnings data before 1926 are from Cowles
and associates, interpolated from annual data. Stock price data are monthly averages of daily closing
prices through January 2010. The CPI-U (Consumer Price Index-All Urban Consumers) published
by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics begins in 1913; for years before 1913 it is spliced to the CPI
Warren and Pearson’s price index, by multiplying it by the ratio of the indexes in January 1913.
December 1999 and January 2000 values for the CPI-U are extrapolated.
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Tables
Parameter Set: r = 0.05; β = 0.30; αD = 0.50; αI = 0.10; αΘ = 0.05;
σ0 = 0.50; σD = 0.10; σI = 1.00; ξ = 0.011.
Table I. Low risk aversion and noise volatility: σΘ = 0.50; ϕ = 0.50.
Candidate Equilibrium Price
Equilibrium Utility p0 pD0 pD1 pI
Equilibrium-Type A 2.90 -91.773 25.641 1.855 18.446
Equilibrium-Type B 0.97 -94.218 25.641 1.855 -30.080
Equilibrium-Type B 0.95 -93.148 25.641 1.855 -30.897
Equilibrium-Type B 0.65 -82.902 25.641 1.855 51.713
Equilibrium-Type B 0.62 -81.688 25.641 1.855 52.479
Equilibrium-Type B 0.41 -93.635 25.641 1.855 5.775
Utility value with the corresponding optimal price coefficient for Equilibrium-Type
A and Equilibrium-Type B with “low” level of risk aversion and noise volatility.
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Table II. High risk aversion and low noise volatility: σΘ = 0.50; ϕ = 1.00.
Candidate Equilibrium Price
Equilibrium Utility p0 pD0 pD1 pI
Equilibrium-Type B 43.96 -2664.632 -89.311 1.855 -13.384
Equilibrium-Type A 4.08 -183.546 25.641 1.855 18.446
Equilibrium-Type B 3.87 -188.435 25.641 1.855 -30.080
Equilibrium-Type B 3.79 -186.296 25.641 1.855 -30.897
Equilibrium-Type B 3.16 -187.271 25.641 1.855 5.775
Equilibrium-Type B 2.60 -165.804 25.641 1.855 51.713
Equilibrium-Type B 2.50 -163.376 25.641 1.855 52.479
Utility value with the corresponding optimal price coefficient for Equilibrium-Type
A and Equilibrium-Type B with “high” level of risk aversion and “low” level of noise
volatility.
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Table III. Low risk aversion and high noise volatility: ϕ = 0.50; σΘ=1.00.
Candidate Equilibrium Price
Equilibrium Utility p0 pD0 pD1 pI
Equilibrium-Type B 8.65 -465.202 -80.445 1.855 -87.639
Equilibrium-Type B 8.39 -675.844 -89.311 1.855 -13.384
Equilibrium-Type A 2.90 -91.773 25.641 1.855 18.446
Equilibrium-Type B 1.39 -91.633 25.641 1.855 18.446
Equilibrium-Type B 0.98 -94.733 25.641 1.855 -29.615
Equilibrium-Type B 0.94 -92.594 25.641 1.855 -31.252
Equilibrium-Type B 0.67 -83.506 25.641 1.855 51.274
Equilibrium-Type B 0.42 -93.688 25.641 1.855 5.775
Utility value with the corresponding optimal price coefficient for Equilibrium-Type
A and Equilibrium-Type B with “low” level of risk aversion and “high” level of noise
volatility.
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Table IV. Descriptive Statistics of data.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis
Pt 0.994 1.002 2.067 6.745
Dt 0.032 0.014 0.730 2.837
P ut 376.379 379.342 2.067 6.745
Dut 12.127 5.642 0.725 2.83
ln(P ut ) -0.362 0.798 0.650 2.607
ln(Dut ) -3.548 0.466 0.047 1.912
Pt is the adjusted de-trended price, Put is real price, ln(Put ) is natural logarithm.
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Table V. Unit Root Test.
ADF PP KPSS
drift trend drift trend drift trend
Pt 0.29 -1.11 -0.99 -2.29 1.15* 0.26
Dt -1.06 -3.46* -1.04 -3.34* 1.65** 0.24
P ut 0.29 -1.11 -1.00 -2.28 1.15** 0.26
Dut -1.06 -3.46* -1.12 -3.34 1.65* 0.24
ln(P ut ) -0.82 -2.29 -1.08 - -2.63 1.48* 0.20*
ln(Dut ) -2.04 -4.81** -1.74 -4.07** 1.69** 0.09
Note: * rejects the at 5 %, ** rejects at 1%
The Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for a unit root against the alternative of an
explosive root is applied to each time series of real price and real dividend, the
de-trended price and de-trended dividend, and the log stock price and log stock
dividend. Similar results are obtained using the Phillips-Perron test used to control
for unspecified autocorrelation and heteroschedasticity and Kwiatkowski-Phillips-
Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) used for testing the stationarity as null hypothesis.
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Table VI. Time Series Properties of the data.
Correlations: ∆Dt ∆Pt ∆Dt ∆Pt
∆Dt 1.00 0.03 ∆Pt 0.03 1.00
∆Dt−1 0.22 -0.00 ∆Pt−1 0.44 0.14
∆Dt−2 -0.16 -0.00 ∆Pt−2 0.06 -0.11
∆Dt−3 -0.17 -0.06 ∆Pt−3 -0.19 -0.09
∆Dt−4 -0.15 -0.08 ∆Pt−4 -0.15 -0.16
∆Dt−5 -0.11 -0.02 ∆Pt−5 -0.06 -0.19
σ(∆Dt) =0.003, σ(∆Pt) = 0.246 σ(∆Dt)/σ(∆Pt) = 0.013
Table reports descriptive statistics of data used in the model estimation.
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Table VII. OLS Regression with heteroskedasticity-robust standard error.
Dependent Variable dividend
price 0.0126∗∗∗
(11.13)
_cons 0.0730∗∗∗
(18.81)
N 140
ADF-test residuals: -2.64*
Portmanteau (Q) statistic = 448.82
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
An OLS regression is performed to derive the implied interest rate.
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Table VIII. Mapping the Maximum Log-Likelihood function 1871–2009,
Equilibrium-Type A and Equilibrium-Type B.
Equilibrium-Type A Equilibrium-Type B
Interest rate assumption NoNoise Full Noise NoNoise Full Noise
3% 807.42 834.88 811.99 830.65
6% 810.82 833.15 808.49 831.47
Free r 814.75 831.62 814.96 828.92
Maximum Likelihood for Equilibrium-Type A and Equilibrium-Type B during
1871–2009, with noise and without noise, and interest rate is 3%, 6% or estimated.
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Table IX. Data 1871–2009: Price Coefficient of Equilibrium-Type A and
Equilibrium-Type B.
Assumption: Interest rate = 0.03, Full Noise
p0 pD0 pI pD1 ML
Equilibrium-Type A -0.001 68.965 65.980 2.985 834.00
Equilibrium-Type B -0.061 39.809 39.803 0.007 830.65
Assumption: Interest rate = 0.06, Full Noise
p0 pD0 pI pD1 ML
Equilibrium-Type A -0.001 22.471 20.657 1.814 833.15
Equilibrium-Type B -0.006 73.246 73.236 0.004 831.47
Assumptions: free r and free γ, Full Noise
p0 pD0 pI pD1 ML
Equilibrium-Type Aa -0.000 64.888 52.342 12.546 831.62
Equilibrium-Type Bb -0.016 4.963 4.892 0.071 828.92
Note: a) interest rate estimated is 0.0309
Note: b) interest rate estimated is 0.0686
Price coefficient of models estimated in Table VIII with noise when interest rate
is assumed 3%, 6% or estimated.
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Table X. Time Series properties of Data 1995–2000
ADF PP KPSS
drift trend drift trend
Price -1.39 -1.43 -1.41 -1.17 0.14
Dividend -2.51 0.37 -2.06 2.05 0.26
D.Price∗ -5.70 -5.83 -7.06 -7.17 0.15
D.Dividend -3.18 -4.54 -3.63 -4.72 0.17
Cointegrating regression: Dt = 0.049 + 0.0017Pt + t
Johansen test: rank(r) = 1: λmax = 1.23 (3.76 at 5%)
rank(r) = 1: λtrace = 1.23 (3.76 at 5%)
(*) D. is a differentiated variable by lag 1
Table reports descriptive statistics of data used in the model estimation.
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Table XI. Mapping the Maximum Log-Likelihood function 1995–2000,
Equilibrium-Type A and Equilibrium-Type B.
Interest rate assumption Equilibrium-Type A Equilibrium-Type B LR-test
1.5% 540.96 636.39 190.86∗∗∗
3% 487.17 638.58 302.08∗∗∗
Free r 489.31 638.43 298.83∗∗∗
LR-test: -2 (Equilibrium-Type A-Equilibrium-Type B)
χ3 = 7.82 (5% =∗), 11.35 (1% =∗∗), 16.27 (0.1% =∗∗∗)
Maximum Likelihood for Equilibrium-Type A and Equilibrium-Type B during
1995–2000, with noise and without noise, and interest rate is 3%, 6% or estimated.
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Table XII. Data 1995–2000: Price’s Coefficient of Equilibrium-Type A and
Equilibrium-Type B.
Assumption: Interest rate = 1.5%, Full Noise
p0 pD0 pI pD1 ML
Equilibrium-Type A -0.177 71.942 67.882 4.060 540.96
Equilibrium-Type B -0.061 71.944 0.001 1.089 636.39
Assumption: Interest rate = 3%, Full Noise
p0 pD0 pI pD1 ML
Equilibrium-Type A -0.124 34.602 31.147 3.455 487.17
Equilibrium-Type B -0.430 34.604 0.002 0.002 638.58
Assumptions: free r and free γ, Full Noise
p0 pD0 pI pD1 ML
Equilibrium-Type Aa -0.506 210.13 70.755 139.23 489.31
Equilibrium-Type Bb -0.883 0.004 1089.196 118.025 638.43
Note: a) interest rate estimated is 0.006
Note: b) interest rate estimated is 0.002
Price coefficient of models estimated in Table XI with noise when interest rate is
assumed 3%, 6% or estimated.
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Table XIII (a). Data 1995–2000. Parameter Estimation Model A.
Assumption: Interest rate = 1.5% and Full Noise.
Maximum Log-Likelihood = 540.96
p˜0 p˜D0 p˜I p˜D1
-0.177 71.942 67.882 4.060
αD = 0.232 αI= 0.232 αΘ = 0.001 ϕ = 16.75
(0.11) (0.000) (0.000)
σD= 0.001 σΘ=0.001 ρI=1.299 λ = 0.002
(0.02) (0.001) (0.002) (0.031)
Estimated parameters of Model A when interest rate is 1.5% as reported in Table
XII.
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Table XIII (b). Data 1995–2000. Parameter Estimation Model B.
Assumption: Interest rate = 1.5% and Full Noise.
Maximum Log-Likelihood = 636.39
p̂0 p̂D0 p̂I p̂D1
-0.061 71.944 0.001 1.089
p˜0 p˜D0 p˜I p˜D1
-0.071 71.942 70.854 67.114
αD = 0.001 αI= 0.905 αΘ = 0.001
(0.11) (0.000) (0.000)
σD= 0.001 σΘ=0.124 ρI=0.001 λ = 0.001
(0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Estimated parameters of Model B when interest rate is 1.5% as reported in Table
XII.
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